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Abstract
P-values are a mainstay in statistics but are often misinterpreted. We propose
a new interpretation of p-value as a meaningful plausibility, where this is to be in-
terpreted formally within the inferential model framework. We show that, for most
practical hypothesis testing problems, there exists an inferential model such that
the corresponding plausibility function, evaluated at the null hypothesis, is exactly
the p-value. The advantages of this representation are that the notion of plausi-
bility is consistent with the way practitioners use and interpret p-values, and the
plausibility calculation avoids the troublesome conditioning on the truthfulness of
the null. This connection with plausibilities also reveals a shortcoming of standard
p-values in problems with non-trivial parameter constraints.
Keywords and phrases: Hypothesis test; inferential model; nesting; plausibility
function; predictive random set.
1 Introduction
P-values are ubiquitous in applied statistics, but are widely misinterpreted as either a
sort of Bayesian posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true, or as a frequentist
error probability. Indeed, in 2012, media were reporting the discovery of the elusive Higgs
boson particle (Overbye 2012) and statistics blogs were pointing out how some journalists
and physicists had misinterpreted the resulting p-values. Our objective here is to provide
a new and simpler way to understand them, so that these misinterpretations might be
avoided.
A prime reason for the frequent misinterpretation of p-values is that the standard
textbook definition is inconsistent with people’s common sense. The goal of this paper
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is to provide a more user-friendly interpretation. We show that the p-value can be inter-
preted as a plausibility that the null hypothesis is true. This “plausibility” is precisely
defined within the inferential model (IM) framework of Martin and Liu (2013a), built
upon two fundamental principles of Martin and Liu (2014a) for valid and efficient sta-
tistical inference. Consider the problem of testing a null hypothesis H0 versus a global
alternative H1. We show that, under mild conditions, for any p-value (depending on H0
and the choice of test statistic), there exists a valid IM such that the plausibility of H0
is the p-value. In this sense, the p-value can be understood as the plausibility, given the
observed data, that H0 is true. In the Higgs boson report, since the p-value is minuscule
(p ≪ 10−6) one concludes that the hypothesis H0 : “the Higgs boson does not exist” is
highly implausible, hence, a discovery. This line of reasoning based on small p-values is
consistent with Cournot’s principle (e.g., Shafer and Vovk 2006).
The word “plausibility” fits the way practitioners use and interpret p-values: a small
p-value means H0 is implausible, given the observed data. Evaluating plausibility involves
a probability calculation that does not require one to assume thatH0 is true, so one avoids
the questionable logic of proving H0 false by using a calculation that assumes it is true.
The use of IMs to provide probabilistic interpretations of classically non-probabilistic
summaries is proving to be beneficial; see, for example, Martin (2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our notation
and gives the formal definition of p-value, with a brief discussion of its common correct
and incorrect interpretations. The basics of IMs are introduced in Section 3, in par-
ticular, predictive random sets and plausibility functions. In Section 4 we prove that,
given essentially any hypothesis testing problem, there is a valid IM such that the corre-
sponding plausibility function, evaluated at the null hypothesis, is the p-value. There we
highlight a similar connection between the IM plausibilities and objective Bayes posterior
probabilities, and an apparently unrecognized shortcoming of p-values in problems with
non-trivial parameter constraints. Two examples involving binomial and normal data are
presented in Sections 4.3–4.4, and some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 The p-value
2.1 Setup and formal definition
Let X denote observable data, taking values in X. There is a sampling model PX|θ,
indexed by a parameter θ ∈ Θ, and the goal is to make inference on θ using the observed
data X = x. Here both X and θ are allowed to be vector-valued, but do will not make
this explicit in the notation. The hypothesis testing problem starts with a hypothesis,
or assertion, about the unknown θ. Mathematically, this is characterized by a subset
Θ0 ⊂ Θ, and we write H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 for the null hypothesis and H1 : θ 6∈ Θ0 for the
alternative hypothesis. The goal is to use observed data X = x to determine, with some
measure of certainty, whether H0 or H1 is true.
Consider the description of the p-value given by Fisher (1959, p. 39), viewed as follows.
If the observed X = x gives small p-value, then one of two things occurred: relative to
H0, a rare chance event has occurred, or H0 is false. The unlikeliness of the former drives
us to conclude the latter. To put this in more standard terms, suppose there is a test
statistic T : X → R, possibly depending on Θ0, such that large values of T (X) suggest
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that H0 may not be true. The p-value is defined, for X = x, as
pval(x) = pvalT,Θ0(x) = sup
θ∈Θ0
PX|θ{T (X) ≥ T (x)}. (1)
When Θ0 = {θ0}, a point null, (1) simplifies to pval(x) = PX|θ0{T (X) ≥ T (x)}, the
expression found in most introductory textbooks.
Intuitively, pval(x) compares the observed T (x) to the sampling distribution of T (X)
when H0 is true. If pval(x) is small, then T (x) is an outlier under H0 and we conclude
that H0 is implausible. Conversely, if pval(x) is relatively large, then the observed T (x)
is consistent with at least one PX|θ, with θ ∈ Θ0, so H0 is plausible in the sense that it
provides an acceptable explanation of reality.
2.2 Standard interpretations
Standard textbooks have adopted an equivalent though arguably more obscure interpre-
tation. The standard textbook interpretation of p-value goes something like this:
pval(x) is the probability that an observable X is “at least as extreme” as the
x actually observed, assuming H0 is true.
This leads to the common misinterpretation of p-value as a sort of Bayesian posterior
probability of H0. Lehmann and Romano (2005, Sec. 3.3), after laying out the details of
the Neyman–Pearson testing program, have it that
pval(x) is the greatest lower bound on the set of all α such that the size-α
test rejects H0 based on T (x).
A danger here is that the conditioning on H0 is hidden in the definition of size; users can
potentially misinterpret pval(x) as the probability of incorrectly rejecting H0 based on x.
Some statisticians have abandoned the use of p-values, advocating for other tools
for measuring evidence supporting H0 and/or testing H0, such as confidence intervals;
see, e.g., Berger and Delampady (1987, Sec. 4.3) and the discussion by G. Casella and
R. Berger on that same paper. This preference for confidence intervals is fairly common
in medical, social, and other applied sciences. Some journals, such as the American
Journal of Public Health, have made concerted efforts to get authors to use confidence
intervals rather than p-values (Fidler et al. 2004). Still, confidence intervals are not free
of their own difficulties, nor are Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery 1995) or Bayesian p-
values (Gelman et al. 1996; Rubin 1984). We think a better or simpler way to understand
the ubiquitous p-value is a valuable contribution.
3 Review of inferential models
3.1 Big picture
The inferential model (IM) framework produces exact prior-free probabilistic measures
of evidence for/against any assertion about the unknown parameter; see Martin and Liu
3
(2013a), Martin et al. (2010), and Zhang and Liu (2011). This is accomplished by first
making an explicit association between the observable data X , the unknown parameter
θ, and an unobservable auxiliary variable U . Random sets are introduced to predict
the unobservable U , and inference about θ is obtained via probability calculations with
respect to the distribution of this random set. The IM framework has some connections
with existing approaches, such as fiducial (Hannig 2009, 2013; Hannig and Lee 2009),
confidence distributions (Xie and Singh 2013; Xie et al. 2011), Dempster–Shafer theory
(Dempster 2008; Shafer 1976, 2011), generalized p-values and confidence intervals (Chiang
2001; Tsui and Weerahandi 1989; Weerahandi 1993), and Bayesian inference with default,
reference, and/or data-dependent priors (Berger 2006; Berger et al. 2009; Fraser 2011;
Fraser et al. 2010; Ghosh 2011).
IMs, fiducial, and Dempster–Shafer theory all introduce auxiliary variables into the
inference problem. Both fiducial and Dempster–Shafer theory condition on the observed
X = x, then develop a sort of distribution on the parameter space by inverting the
data–parameter–auxiliary variable relationship and assuming that U retains its a priori
distribution after X = x is observed. The IM approach targets the (unattainable) best
possible inference corresponding to the case where U is observed. Uncertainty about θ, af-
ter X = x is observed, is propagated from the uncertainty about hitting the true U with a
random set. In addition to accomplishing Fisher’s goal of prior-free probabilistic inference,
IMs produce inferential output which is valid for any assertion of interest (Section 3.3);
fiducial probabilities are valid only for special kinds of assertions (Martin and Liu 2013a,
Sec. 4.3.1). Moreover, a general theory of optimal IMs, concerning efficiency of the re-
sulting inference, may not be out of reach.
3.2 Construction
Following Martin and Liu (2013a), the IM construction proceeds in three steps.
A-step. This proceeds by specifying an association between X , θ, and U . Like fiducial,
Dempster–Shafer, and Fraser’s structural models (Fraser 1968), this can be described by
a pair (PU , a), where PU describes the distribution (and also, implicitly, the support U)
of the auxiliary variable U , and a describes the data-generating mechanism driven by PU .
We write this as
X = a(θ, U), with U ∼ PU .
That is, if U is sampled from PU and then plugged in to the function a for a given θ, then
the resulting X has distribution PX|θ. The association need not be described by a formal
equation—it is enough to have a rule/recipe to construct X from a given θ and U ; see
e.g., Section 4.3. To complete the A-step, construct a sequence of subsets of Θ indexed
by (x, u):
Θx(u) = {θ : x = a(θ, u)}. (2)
P-step. Based on the idea that knowing the unobserved value of U is “as good as” knowing
θ itself, the goal of the prediction step is to predict this unobserved value with a predictive
random set, denoted by S. Certain assumptions are required on the support S and
distribution PS of the predictive random set; see Section 3.3.
C-step. This step combines the observed X = x, which specifies a sub-collection of sets
Θx(·) in (2), with the predictive random set S. The result is an x-dependent random
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subset of Θ:
Θx(S) =
⋃
u∈S Θx(u). (3)
Evidence for/against an assertion A ⊆ Θ concerning the unknown parameter can now be
obtained via the PS-probability that Θx(S) is/is not a subset of A. More precisely, we
evaluate
belx(·;S) = PS{Θx(S) ⊆ ·}, (4)
the belief function, at both A and Ac, as a summary of evidence for and against A,
respectively. Alternatively, we can report belx(A;S) together with
plx(A;S) = PS{Θx(S) ∩A 6= ∅} = 1− belx(A
c;S), (5)
the plausibility function at A. It can be readily shown that belx(A;S) ≤ plx(A;S) for
any A and any S. Then, as described briefly below, the pair {belx(·;S), plx(·;S)} is used
for inference about θ; see Martin and Liu (2013a) for details.
Statistical inference based on the IM output focuses on the relative magnitudes of
belx(A;S) and plx(A;S). An assertion A is deemed true (resp. untrue), given X = x, if
both belx(A;S) and plx(A;S) are large (resp. small). Conversely, if belx(A;S) is small
and plx(A;S) is large, then there is no clear decision to be made about the truthfulness
of A, given X = x, so maybe one needs more data. The definition of “small” and “large”
values of belief/plausibility functions are specified by the theoretical validity properties
discussed in Section 3.3.
One can also construct frequentist procedures based on plausibility functions. For
example, for α ∈ (0, 1), a 100(1− α)% plausibility region for θ is defined as
Πα(x) = {θ : plx(θ;S) > α}. (6)
It is a consequence of Theorem 1 below that this region achieves the nominal 1 − α
frequentist coverage probability.
Throughout it is assumed that Θx(u) in (2) satisfies Θx(u) 6= ∅ for all (x, u) pairs.
This boils down to there being no non-trivial constraints on the parameter space Θ. When
this fails, one can usually take a dimension-reduction step, described in Martin and Liu
(2014b), to transform to a problem where this assumption holds. Under this condition,
it is sometimes convenient to evaluate the plausibility on the u-space as opposed to the
θ-space as in (5). Given x and A, let
Ux(A) = cl{u : Θx(u) ⊆ A}, (7)
where clB denotes the closure of the set B. If Θx(u) 6= ∅ for all (x, u), as we have
assumed, then belief and plausibility can be evaluated on the u-space as
belx(A;S) = PS{S ⊆ Ux(A)} and plx(A;S) = 1− PS{S ⊆ Ux(A
c)}. (8)
This formulation is used in the main result in Section 4.
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3.3 IM validity
It is important that the IM’s belief and plausibility functions are meaningful across similar
studies. This type of meaningfulness is referred to as validity in Martin and Liu (2013a).
Here, the IM is said to be valid if
sup
θ∈A
PX|θ{plX(A;S) ≤ α} ≤ α, ∀ A ⊆ Θ, ∀ α ∈ (0, 1). (9)
This means that, if A is true, then plx(A;S) is small for only a small proportion of possible
x values, “outliers.” Since it holds for all A ⊆ Θ, a similar statement about belX(A;S)
can also be made. Validity holds, without special modification, even for the scientifically
important case of singleton A. In fact, for reasonably chosen predictive random sets (see
Martin and Liu 2013a, Corollary 1), the latter “≤ α” can be replaced by “= α;” hence
plX(A;S) ∼ Unif(0, 1) when A = {θ0} is true. In Theorem 2 below we show that the
p-value is a plausibility function at the null hypothesis. So (9) restates the familiar result
that, if the null hypothesis is true, then the p-value is (stochastically dominated by) a
Unif(0, 1) random variable.
The validity property (9) holds if the predictive random set S satisfies certain condi-
tions, no requirements on PX|θ or the association (PU , a) are needed. Let (U,U ) be the
measurable space on which PU is defined, and assume that U contains all closed subsets
of U. Martin and Liu (2013a) gives the following result.
Theorem 1. The IM is valid for all assertions A ⊆ Θ if Θx(u) 6= ∅ for all (x, u) and
the predictive random set S satisfies the following:
P1. The support S ⊂ 2U of S contains ∅ and U, and:
(a) each S ∈ S is closed and, hence PU -measurable, and
(b) for any S, S ′ ∈ S, either S ⊆ S ′ or S ′ ⊆ S.
P2. The distribution PS of S satisfies PS{S ⊆ K} = supS∈S:S⊆K PU(S), K ⊆ U.
Martin and Liu (2013a) show that a wide variety of predictive random sets are avail-
able for which P1–P2 hold, so that IM validity is rather easy to arrange. However,
efficiency is a concern and, for this, they present a theory of optimal IMs.
4 P-value as an IM plausibility
4.1 Main result
On the association (a,PU), the null hypothesis Θ0, and the test statistic T : X → T, we
assume the following.
A1. For every (x, u) there exists θ such that T (x) = T (a(θ, u)).
A2. supθ∈Θ0 T (a(θ, ·)) is a PU -measurable function.
A3. PU{supθ∈Θ0 T (a(θ, U)) < t} = infθ∈Θ0 PU{T (a(θ, U)) < t} for all t ∈ T.
Here, A2 ensures the meaningfulness of the probability statement in A3, and holds gen-
erally under mild separability and continuity conditions, respectively, on Θ0 and on T
and a, while A3 makes precise the stochastic smoothness and stochastic ordering T (X)
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should possess as a function of θ. Assumptions A2–A3 hold trivially for the important
point-null case. It is also easy to check A3 in many common examples, e.g., if X1, . . . , Xn
are iid N(θ, 1), and T (X) = X¯ , then T (a(θ, U)) = θ+ U , and A3 holds for any Θ0 of the
form (−∞, θ0].
Theorem 2. If A1–A3 hold for the given association (a,PU), hypothesis Θ0, and test
statistic T : X → T, then there exists an admissible predictive random set S, depending
on T and Θ0, such that the plausibility function plx(Θ0;S) equals pval(x) = pvalT,Θ0(x)
in (1) for all x ∈ X.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we reduce the baseline association X = a(θ, U), with
U ∼ PU , to T (X) = T (a(θ, U)), again with U ∼ PU . In this case, the A-step of the IM
construction generates the collection of subsets:
Θx(u) = {θ : T (x) = T (a(θ, u))}, x ∈ X, u ∈ U.
These sets are non-empty for all (x, u) by A1. For the P-step, we define a collection
S = {St : t ∈ T} of subsets of U with
St = cl{u : supθ∈Θ0 T (a(θ, u)) < t}, t ∈ T.
The sets are closed, are nested, and PU -measurability follows from A2. Thus P1 in
Theorem 1 holds. Define a predictive random set S, supported on S, with distribution
PS satisfying
PS{S ⊆ K} = PU(St⋆
K
) = inf
θ∈Θ0
PX|θ{T (X) < t
⋆
K}, K ⊆ U, (10)
where t⋆K = sup{t ∈ T : St ⊆ K}; the last equality in (10) is a consequence of A3. For
such as S, the corresponding IM is valid. For notational consistency, set A = Θ0. The
C-step proceeds as in the general case in Section 3.2, and, for any x ∈ X, the plausibility
function (8), evaluated at A, satisfies
plx(A;S) = 1− PS{S ⊆ Ux(A
c)} = 1− PS{S ⊆ ST (x)}. (11)
The second equality in (11) needs justification. First, we have ST (x) ⊆ Ux(A
c) since
u ∈ ST (x) =⇒ T (x) > supθ∈A T (a(θ, u))
=⇒ T (x) = T (a(θ, u)) ∃ θ 6∈ A
=⇒ Θx(u) ⊆ A
c
=⇒ u ∈ Ux(A
c).
It remains to show that ST (x) is the largest of the St’s contained in Ux(A
c). For any
small ε > 0, there exists u ∈ ST (x)+ε such that T (x) ≤ supθ∈A T (a(θ, u)); for this u,
Θx(u) 6⊆ A
c, so u 6∈ Ux(A
c). We have verified (11), so
plx(A;S) = 1− PS{S ⊆ ST (x)}
= 1− inf
θ∈A
PX|θ{T (X) < T (x)} [by (10)]
= sup
θ∈A
PX|θ{T (X) ≥ T (x)}.
The right-hand side is pval(x) in (1), completing the proof.
Corollary 1. Under A1, if Θ0 = {θ0}, then the conclusion of Theorem 2 holds.
Proof. Conditions A2–A3 hold automatically for singleton Θ0 and suitable T .
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4.2 Remarks
Dempster (2008, p. 375) points out a similar connection between plausibility and p-
value; specifically, he shows numerically how Fisher’s p-value can be decomposed into two
pieces—one piece corresponding to belief in H0 and the other corresponding to “don’t
know”—the sum of which is our plausibility. His example is for the standard test for
a Poisson mean based on a one-sided alternative hypothesis, and he claims no such a
correspondence in general.
In the Bayesian setting, a search for “objective” priors often focuses on probability
matching (e.g., Ghosh 2011), i.e., choose the prior such that the corresponding poste-
rior tail probabilities and p-values are asymptotically equivalent. Given the connection
between p-values and IM plausibilities, these objective Bayes posterior probabilities can
also be interpreted as plausibilities. This is perhaps not surprising given that objective
Bayes posterior distributions can be viewed as a simple and attractive way to approximate
frequentist p-values (Fraser 2011).
This connection between p-values and plausibilities also casts light on the argument
in Schervish (1996) concerning the use of p-values as measures of evidence; see, also,
Berger and Sellke (1987). He shows that, in general, p-values fail to satisfy that, for a
given x, if Θ′0 ⊆ Θ0, then the p-value for Θ
′
0 should be no more than the p-value for Θ0.
Theorem 2 explains this lack of coherence in that p-values for different hypotheses may
be plausibilities with respect to different IMs with different scales. The same is true for
Bayesian posterior probabilities for Θ′0 and Θ0 if different priors are used for each testing
problem, which would not necessarily be unusual.
In case Θx(u) = ∅ for some pair (x, u), constructing an IM with plausibility function
matching the p-value cannot be done as described in the proof of Theorem 2. Such a
situation arises, for example, in a normal mean problem N(θ, 1) with Θ = [−1, 1]. If
X = −1 is observed, then Θ−1(u) = {θ ∈ [−1, 1] : −1 = θ + Φ
−1(u)} is empty for
u > 1/2. For such problems, Ermini Leaf and Liu (2012) present a modification of the
IM approach that stretches the predictive random set just enough so that Θx(S) is not
empty while maintaining validity. The result of this stretching is, in general, an increase
in the plausibility function. The p-value depends only on the null hypothesis, so is not
affected by parameter constraints. This is a shortcoming of the p-value, as evidence for
a particular assertion should automatically become larger when the range of possible
alternatives shrinks.
4.3 Binomial example
Consider a binomial model, X ∼ Bin(n, θ), where n is a known positive integer and
θ ∈ (0, 1) is the unknown success probability. Inference on θ in the binomial model is a
basic problem that is far from trivial (e.g., Brown et al. 2001). In this case, the natural
association is
Fθ(X − 1) ≤ U < Fθ(X), U ∼ Unif(0, 1),
where Fθ is the Bin(n, θ) distribution function. There is no simple equation linking
(X, θ, U) in this case, just a rule “X = a(θ, U)” for producing X with given θ and U . We
construct the p-value-based IM for a one-sided assertion/hypothesis.
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Consider A = (0, θ0] for some fixed θ0 ∈ (0, 1). If the null hypothesis is H0 : θ ∈ A,
then the uniformly most powerful test rejects H0 in favor of H1 : θ ∈ A
c if and only if
T (X) = X is too large. With this choice of T , for the A-step, we write
Θx(u) = {θ : T (x) = T (a(θ, u))} = {θ : Fθ(x− 1) ≤ u < Fθ(x)}.
If Ga,b denotes the Beta(a, b) distribution function, then we may rewrite Θx(u) as
Θx(u) = {θ : Gn−x+1,x(1− θ) ≤ u < Gn−x,x+1(1− θ)}
= {θ : 1−G−1n−x+1,x(u) ≤ θ < 1−G
−1
n−x,x+1(u)}.
For the P-step, we construct the support S = {St : t ∈ T}, where, in this case, T = X =
{0, 1, . . . , n}. It is easy to see that
St = cl{u : supθ∈A T (a(θ, u)) < t} = [Fθ0(t), 1].
When equipped with the measure PS in P2, determined by PU = Unif(0, 1), the C-step
produces a plausibility function for A = (0, θ0], at the observed X = x, given by
plx(A;S) = 1− Fθ0(x),
which is exactly the standard p-value for the one-sided test in a binomial problem.
4.4 Normal variance example
Consider a normal model, N(µ, σ2), and a sequence of independent samples X1, . . . , Xn.
Here, θ = (µ, σ2) is unknown, but the goal is inference on σ2, with µ a nuisance parameter.
Following the general conditioning principles in Martin and Liu (2014b), we can focus on
IMs determined by the minimal sufficient statistic,
X¯ = µ+ σn−1/2Z and (n− 1)S2 = σ2W,
where Z ∼ N(0, 1) and W ∼ ChiSq(n − 1), independent. This association involves two
auxiliary variables but, since the goal is inference about the scalar σ2, we can reduce the
dimension. Write
X¯ = µ+
S
n1/2
Z
{W/(n− 1)}1/2
and (n− 1)S2 = σ2W.
Since µ is a location parameter, it follows from Martin and Liu (2013b) that the first
expression displayed above can be ignored, leaving the second as the marginal association
for σ2, which we now write as
T = σ2F−1(U), U ∼ Unif(0, 1),
where T = (n− 1)S2 and F is the ChiSq(n− 1) distribution function.
Consider testing H0 : σ
2 ≤ σ20 versus H1 : σ
2 > σ20. For observed T = t, the standard
test has p-value pval(t) = P{T ≥ t} = 1 − F (t/σ20). It is straightforward to check that,
with predictive random set S = [0, U), with U ∼ Unif(0, 1), the plausibility function is
plt({σ
2 ≤ σ20};S) = PS{S ∋ F (t/σ
2)} = P{U ≥ F (t/σ20)} = 1− F (t/σ
2
0),
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Figure 1: Plot of plausibility as a function of σ20 in the normal variance example.
which is exactly the p-value. Moreover, the predictive random set above is “optimal”
in the sense of Martin and Liu (2013a, Section 4.3.1), which provides some IM-based
explanation for this test being the standard one in the statistics literature.
For an illustration, consider data presented in Problem 2-14 of Montgomery (2001)
on the etch uniformity on silicon wafers taken during a qualification experiment. In this
case, the sample size is n = 20 and the sample variance is S2 = 0.79. If σ20 = 1 so the goal
is testing if σ2 ≤ 1, the p-value is 0.72, and the null hypothesis is quite plausible. More
generally, we can plot the plausibility (or p-value) as a function of σ20; see Figure 1. The
horizontal line at α = 0.1 characterizes a 90% plausibility lower bound for σ2 defined by
keeping all those σ20 values with plausibility greater than 0.1; see (6).
5 Discussion
We have developed a new user-friendly interpretation of the familiar but often misinter-
preted p-value. Specifically, we have shown that, for essentially any hypothesis testing
problem, under mild conditions, there exists a valid IM such that its plausibility func-
tion, evaluated at the null hypothesis, is exactly the usual p-value. This representation
of p-values in terms of IM plausibilities casts light on a potential shortcoming of p-values
that can arise in problems with non-trivial parameter constraints. In such cases, it is not
clear how to modify the p-value, while modifications of the IM plausibility are readily
obtained via the methods described in Ermini Leaf and Liu (2012).
There are a numerous alternatives to p-value in the hypothesis testing literature,
popular, at least in part, because of the difficulties in interpreting p-values. For example,
Jim Berger (and co-authors) have recommended converting p-values to Bayes factors, or
posterior odds, for interpretation; for example, Sellke et al. (2001) make a strong case for
their suggested “−ep log p” adjustment. However, it is unlikely that p-values will ever
disappear from textbooks and applied work, so compared to offering an alternative to the
familiar p-value, it may be more valuable to offer a more user-friendly interpretation. To
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borrow an analogy Larry Wasserman used on his blog:1 many people are poor drivers,
but eliminating cars is not the answer to this problem.
The connection between plausibility and p-value casts light on the nature of the IM
output. IM belief and plausibility functions are understood in Martin and Liu (2013a)
as measures of evidence given data. The fact that, in some cases, plausibility and p-
value match up is useful, suggesting that one could reason with IM plausibilities as
with p-values. The correspondence between plausibilities, p-values, and some objective
Bayes posterior probabilities, and the fact that IMs contain the fiducial/Dempster–Shafer
paradigms as special cases, suggests that the IM framework may in fact provide a unified
perspective on robust, objective, probabilistic inference.
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